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Southern Africa

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22 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Comment on Planning Group Paper "Problems of Southern Africa."

1. We believe that the general line taken by the paper is a good one. In particular, we agree with the thrust of the policy suggestions.

2. We also feel, however, that there are numerous errors of fact and interpretation, some of which bear directly on the policy sections. Among the more important of these are the following:

a. Page 16: The statement that "resolution of Katanga separation should reduce the counterproductive influence Tshombe has had...on Federation policy" is unclear. If it means that a detente in the Congo will make the whites who now control the Federation (and who will still control Southern Rhodesia in the event of the Federations's breakup) any easier to deal with, we would disagree. Rather, we feel that any sign of a weakening in Tshombe's "independence" will make the whites even less willing to liberalize their racial attitudes. A period of Elisabethville-Leopoldville amity might reduce this reluctance, but we would foresee no appreciable change in the relatively short time-span to which this paper directs itself.

b. Page 22: We doubt that the British role is completely passive. It is indirect and limited in its effectiveness, but we are fairly sure, for instance, that London has influenced Whitehead's apparent decision to reschedule elections for December.

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c. Page 29: Our impression is that the Carpio-Martinez De Alva visit and its aftermath made it less likely than ever that the South African Government will cooperate with any UN initiative on South-West Africa.

d. Page 30: We would suggest that Swaziland's economic potential is an even more cogent reason for giving more attention to it. On the other hand, we suspect that Basutoland for numerous reasons--its location, the presence of an entrenched nationalist party with wide overseas contacts, and its basic poverty--rather than Swaziland will turn out to be the "test case" among the High Commission Territories.

3. We would also make the following relatively minor comments:

a. Page 1: We would suggest that here or in the body of the paper, mention be made of the fact that extensive violence in southern Africa would also jeopardize the only important industrial economy south of the Sahara, thereby adding to the economic difficulties of neighboring territories.

b. Page 6: We would suggest substituting "Afrikaner" for "Boer" in line 3, and "English-speaking South Africans" for "British" in line 6. In the second and third lines of the second paragraph, we would suggest the following wording: "...is offering the Africans at least 15 out of 65 seats in the colony's legislature, which is as far as Prime Minister Whitehead feels he can push..."

c. Page 7: Here and elsewhere in the paper we believe that note should be taken of Whitehead's apparent decision to hold the elections in December. Concerning the second line of the first complete paragraph, Northern Rhodesia is now controlled by the Central African office rather than the Commonwealth and Colonial Office; and concerning the last line of that paragraph, the Anglo-American Corporation (not the British Rand Corporation) is the second company which is supporting Kaunda. We would also question whether the British South Africa Company would "favor a strong white stand in a showdown." We feel it might well give up its mineral concession rights and try to fall back on its extensive agricultural and trading activity, rather than run the risks of all-out opposition to African nationalism.

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d. Page 8: In the second paragraph, we feel note should be taken of the fact that nearly 20,000 of the "Portuguese troops" are Africans. We also feel that the first sentence of the last paragraph takes too little account of factors in Katanga (and in the Congo in general) which operated independently of European interest. The latter merely gave Tshombe the means to do what he and numerous other local Congolese leaders wanted to do; and removal of the mining companies' influence would merely remove an aggravating factor, not the problem itself.

e. Page 12: We feel that the wording in the first three lines gives rather short shrift to the desires of the radical Africans to operate on their own and the possibility that they might resist bloc participation on the scale envisaged in the passage.

f. Page 20: We agree that Kaunda's supporters will have the largest single bloc of seats in the legislature, but we are not completely confident that they will have even a "slight majority." We believe that the complexities of the Northern Rhodesian constitution are so great that no flat prediction is possible.

g. Page 31: This is the first indication we have seen that the South African Government is backpedalling on the franchise question.

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